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Abstract: 
This article sets out to investigate the reasons why some household businesses decide to register and 
become formal (while others do not) in order to shed light on the origins of informality. We use 
qualitative as well as quantitative data on household businesses (HB) derived from first-hand 
representative surveys implemented in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city. The study reveals that although 
most of the informal businesses operate ‘illegally’, this is more due to unclear registration legislation 
than the mark of a deliberate intention to evade the economic regulations.Among the different factors 
which influence the registration decisions, the reason for setting up the business appears to be a 
determining one: the more it is a real choice (businesses set up to be independent or to follow a family 
tradition) and the less a constraint (set up for lack of an job alternative), the more the HB is more 
inclined to be registered. Furthermore, the analysis highlights that incentives do prove decisive insofar 
as the probability of having a formal business is greater among HB heads who consider that 
registration provides at least partial protection from corruption. Besides, access to information, the 
market and large business orders also drive the informal entrepreneurs to register. These results stress 
the need for clarification of the legal framework as well as incentive policies in order to address the 
issue of informality. 
Key words: Informal Sector, Vietnam, Registration, Corruption, Incentives. 
Résumé 
Cet article se propose d'analyser les raisons pour lesquelles certaines unités de production (household 
businesses, HB) décident de s'enregistrer et de devenir formelles (et pourquoi d'autres ne le font pas) 
afin d'éclairer les origines de l'informalité. Nous mobilisons des données aussi bien quantitatives que 
qualitatives sur les HB, issues d'enquêtes représentatives et de première main conduite par nos soins à 
Hanoï et Ho Chi Minh ville. L'étude révèle que bien que la plupart des unités informelles opère 
"illégalement", ce trait procède plus d'une législation floue et méconnue que d'une volonté délibérée 
d'échapper aux régulations publiques. Parmi les différents facteurs qui jouent sur la décision de 
s'enregistrer, le motif qui a conduit à s'établir à son compte est déterminant : plus il s'agit d'un véritable 
choix (volonté d'échapper au salariat ou par tradition familiale) et moins il résulte d'une contrainte 
(manque d'alternative d'emploi), et plus le chef d'unité sera enclin à s'enregistrer. De plus, l'analyse 
met en évidence le rôle des incitations dans la probabilité de devenir formel. Ainsi, ceux qui 
considèrent que l'enregistrement protège (au moins partiellement) de la corruption sont plus nombreux 
à régulariser leur situation. Enfin, l'accès à l'information, aux marchés et aux commandes des grandes 
entreprises favorisent l'enregistrement. Ces résultats soulignent le besoin de clarification de la 
législation des entreprises ainsi que l'importance de politiques incitatives pour s'attaquer à la question 
de l'informalité. 
Mots Clés : Secteur informel, Vietnam, enregistrement, corruption, incitations. 
JEL Code: J24; O17; N85 
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1. Introduction  
The informal sector is predominant in Vietnam. In 2007, it accounted for almost 11 million of 
the country’s 46 million jobs. This represented nearly a quarter of all main jobs, with nearly 
half of non-farm jobs found in the informal sector. All in all, there were 8.4 million informal 
household businesses (IHBs) out of a total number of 10.3 million household businesses 
(HBs), of which 7.4 million were held by an HB head in his/her main job and 1 million in 
his/her second job (Cling et al. 2010). Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), which are the 
two main economic hubs in Vietnam and the focus of this paper, counted more than 1 million 
informal household businesses (out of 1.4 million HBs). IHBs employed 1.5 million people 
(2.2 million people in all HBs) and were the leading source of employment. In keeping with 
international definitions, the informal sector is defined as all private unincorporated 
enterprises that produce some of their goods and services for sale or barter, are not registered 
(no business licence) and are engaged in non-agricultural activities (ILO 2002).  
The massive presence of the informal sector is not specific to Vietnam: in less developed 
countries, informality is the norm rather than the exception (Jütting and de Laiglesia 2009). 
The economic literature contains three dominant schools of thought on the origins and causes 
of informality (Roubaud 1994, Bacchetta et al. 2009). The ‘dualist’ approach is an extension 
of the work by Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970). It is based on a dual labour 
market model where the informal sector is considered to be a residual component of this 
market totally unrelated to the formal economy. It is a subsistence economy that only exists 
because the formal economy is incapable of providing enough jobs. Unlike the dualist school, 
the ‘structuralist’ approach focuses on the interdependencies between the informal and formal 
sectors (Moser 1978, Portes et al. 1989). Under this neo-Marxist approach, the informal sector 
is part of, but subordinate to the capitalist system; by providing formal firms with cheap 
labour and products, the informal sector increases the economy’s flexibility and 
competitiveness. Last of all, the ‘legalist’ or orthodox’ approach considers that the informal 
sector is made up of micro-entrepreneurs who prefer to operate informally to evade the 
economic regulations (De Soto 1989); this liberal school of thought is in sharp contrast to the 
other two in that the choice of informality is voluntary due to the exorbitant legalization costs 
associated with formal status and registration. 
A brief overview of the literature on the informal sector in Vietnam draws a mixed conclusion 
about the determinants of employment in the informal sector. Many studies take up the 
orthodox theory that cumbersome public regulations, both de jure (2000 and 2005 Law on 
Enterprises) and de facto, obstruct the process of business formalization (Van Arkadie and 
Mallon 2003, Taussig and Pham 2004, Malesky and Taussig 2009, Nguyen Trang and Pham 
Minh Tu 2006, Vijverberg et al. 2006). This topic draws in particular on work by the World 
Bank’s Doing Business programme (2009) and its local offshoots such as the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (Malesky 2008). A few other studies highlight the segmentation of the 
labour market, which is consistent with the dual approach (Rand and Torm 2012a). In the 
same vein, Oostendorp et al. (2009) study the household business dynamics and consider that 
this is a low productivity sector that serves as a safety net for the poor. A fraction of the 
literature also looks at small and micro-enterprises and craft activities, especially the 
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phenomenon of craft villages, which is highly specific to this country (Fanchette and Nguyen 
2012). These craft villages specialize in one production each (clothing, furniture, pottery, 
etc.). Together with a few formal enterprises, both formal and informal household businesses 
operate there, often as sub-contractors. 
This review of the literature also points up three observations: 
• First of all, few of these studies take up the international definition of the informal 
sector based on unregistered household businesses. Either they cover a broader 
spectrum of private sector enterprises and include the informal sector in household 
businesses (Taussig and Pham 2004, Oostendorp et al. 2009) or they adopt measures 
that confuse the informal sector with informal employment (Tenev et al. 2003). 
Indeed, until recently, the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 
conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO) was the only nationally 
representative statistical survey providing an approximate measure of the informal 
economy (but no direct measure of the informal sector); 
• Secondly, most of these studies are based on ad-hoc partial surveys that only cover a 
few hundred businesses concentrated in certain activity sectors (for street vendors, see 
Jensen and Peppard 2003) and certain provinces that differ depending on the study in 
question. The most ambitious survey of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Vietnam is managed by the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) and 
the University of Copenhagen. It covers over 2,000 businesses. Many studies draw on 
this survey data (Rand and Torm 2012a, Tran et al. 2008), but the survey cannot claim 
to be representative of the informal sector (and indeed the authors do not claim so);  
• Last of all, none of these studies specifically addresses the determinants of 
registration. Instead, they interview the heads of household businesses about their 
problems and economic constraints and draw conclusions from their answers 
concerning their registration behaviour and the determinants of the informal sector. 
Some other studies measure segmentation by means of estimates of wage gaps and 
derive from them a diagnostic on the dualism of the labour market (Rand and Torm 
ibid). 
This article sets out to analyze the interactions between the State and the informal sector in 
order to improve our understanding of the origins of informality. It goes further than the 
abovementioned studies on the subject. It is the first to take into account direct observations 
of the informal sector based on international definitions in order to analyze the determinants 
of registration using econometric estimates on individual data. Two representative surveys (1-
2-3 surveys) conducted by the authors specifically to measure the informal sector in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City provide the basis for this paper. We also draw some results from 
qualitative interviews conducted on a sub-sample of the quantitative surveys (Razafindrakoto 
and Nguyen 2010). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the main 
characteristics of the informal sector in the two main economic hubs in Vietnam, Hanoi and 
HCMC. Section 3 presents the legislation on household business registration and describes the 
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extent to which the informal sector is unknown to the State registration services. Section 4 
sheds light on informal unit heads’ attitudes to registration using descriptive statistics. Section 
5 estimates econometric probit models on individual data in order to analyze the determinants 
of registration. The last section concludes.  
2. Informal sector data and main characteristics 
The GSO conducted the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the first time in August 2007 on a 
large nationwide sample of 173,000 households, with the technical assistance of the authors. 
In addition to the general objective to produce a broad set of labour market indicators in line 
with international standards, the questionnaire was also specifically designed to capture the 
informal sector and informal employment. The LFS measured employment in household 
businesses (formal and informal) and painted an overall picture of the informal sector in 
Vietnam, comparing it with other sectors of activity. In Vietnam, household businesses are 
supposed to have no more than ten employees and to have one establishment only. Above this 
threshold, or if they have two or more establishments, HBs must become corporate enterprises 
governed by the Law on Enterprises. The LFS also identified the household businesses’ 
heads, who were interviewed in the second phase (see below). 
A specific Household Business & Informal Sector (HB&IS) Survey was grafted on to the 
LFS2007 and carried out by interviewing HB heads identified by the LFS, in keeping with the 
framework of mixed (household-enterprise) surveys (ILO 2012). It was conducted in Hanoi in 
December 2007 and in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) in January 2008 under a research 
programme led by the authors of this paper.1 
 This representative business survey in each of the two provinces interviewed 1,305 HBs in 
Hanoi (992 informal and 313 formal) and 1,333 HBs in Ho Chi Minh City (962 informal and 
371 formal). This targeted survey was designed to provide reliable, low-cost estimates of the 
weight and characteristics of the informal sector, based on the 1-2-3 Survey methodology 
(Razafindrakoto et al. 2009). It provided very rich and detailed information on the informal 
sector, which forms the basis of the research presented in this paper.  
The questions were mostly quantitative, but some questions, especially those on determinants 
of registration, were qualitative in view of their different nature. The answers to the HB&IS 
survey on registration were rounded out by a qualitative survey (semi-directive interviews) 
conducted by the authors with 60 HBs in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. These qualitative 
questions were designed to provide more insight into the reasons why some household 
businesses decide to register and become formal (while others do not) and the implications of 
registration for their business. The answers on this subject are analyzed in Section 4. 
If we exclude farming activities, the total number of informal household businesses comes to 
approximately 300,000 in Hanoi and 750,000 in HCMC. Total employment in these HBs 
amounts to respectively 470,000 and one million workers. The large gap in the number of 
informal household businesses and jobs between the two largest cities in Vietnam (the ratio is 
less than 1 to 2) may be due to two factors. First, HCMC is the larger of the two cities in 
terms of geographical and residential area as well as population.2 Second, the private sector in 
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the southern city is reportedly more developed (as this city is more market-oriented compared 
with the capital city).  
The informal sectors in Hanoi and HCMC share a fairly similar structure by industry (Table 
1). In both cases, IHBs are concentrated essentially in ‘services’ (respectively 40% and 42% 
of total employment) and ‘trade’ (31% and 29%), and only marginally in ‘manufacturing & 
construction’ (28% and 29%). ‘Services’ consist mainly of small restaurants, repair services 
and transport; ‘trade’ of the wholesale and retail trade; and ‘manufacturing’ of food and 
textile & clothing products.  
IHBs operate in precarious conditions and have little access to public services. They are 
atomized and entrepreneurial dynamics seem limited. The informal sector comprises an 
extremely high number of micro-units. In Hanoi as in HCMC, the average size of an IHB is 
1.5 workers including the IHB head. The average size of an FHB is larger, especially in 
HCMC. The lack of premises is a major constraint that prevents IHBs from increasing their 
manpower. Only 16% of IHBs in Hanoi and 12% of IHBs in HCMC have specific 
professional premises from which to run their business. About 50% of informal entrepreneurs 
work from home and nearly 40% have no premises. The proportion of IHBs operating without 
premises is the highest in ‘trade’ and ‘services’, which often work outdoors, and the lowest in 
‘manufacturing’, where it is totally marginal. 
Table 1. Characteristics of informal household businesses in Hanoi and HCMC 
 Hanoi 
 
IHBs 
(%) 
Jobs 
(%) 
Average 
size 
Type of premises  
(%) 
 Mixed Income  
((Millions VND) 
 
   No  
premises 
Home Prof. 
premises 
 Average 
 
Median 
 
 
   
 
Manufacturing 18.2 27.8 2.2 6.5 85.4 8.1  2,298 1,500 
Trade 37.3 32.6 1.3 45.3 32.5 22.2  2,195 1,330 
Services 44.5 39.6 1.3 49.1 36.9 14.0  2,553 1,557 
Total IHB 100 100 1.4 39.9 44.1 16.0 2,365 1,500 
Total FHB - - 2.3 5.8 35.3 58.9  3,597 1,500 
 Ho Chi Minh City 
 
IHBs 
(%) 
Jobs 
(%) 
Average 
size 
Type of premises  
(%) 
 Mixed Income  
((Millions VND) 
 
   No  
premises 
Home Prof. 
premises 
 Average 
income 
Median 
income 
 
   
 
Manufacturing 21.9 29.6 2.0 2.0 91.5 6.5  1,919 1,300 
Trade 32.2 28.7 1.3 42.5 41.5 16.0  2,055 1,270 
Services 45.9 41.7 1.4 50.2 38.1 11.7  2,394 1,473 
Total IHB 100 100 1.5 37.2 50.9 11.9 2,156 1,371 
Total FHB  - 2.6 2.9 36.3 60.8  2,750 1,500 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations.  
The corollary of these precarious operating conditions is poor employment, earnings and 
labour conditions. Despite long working hours, earnings are low and social security coverage 
is non-existent. The average monthly income amounts to 2.2 million VND in Hanoi and to 2.4 
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million VND in HCMC (respectively 137 and 150 USD).3 It is higher by half for FHBs in 
Hanoi and about one-third higher in HCMC. The median monthly income is 1.5 million VND 
in Hanoi (less than 100 USD) and slightly less in HCMC, without any significant difference 
between IHBs and FHBs. The vast majority of the workers are self-employed or family 
workers. The proportion of wage earners is very low. The number of years of schooling is 
below the average in Vietnam. Formal agreement between employers and employees in the 
form of a written contract exists only in exceptional cases. Workers in formal household 
businesses benefit from better conditions than in informal ones, even though these are far 
from satisfactory. Women are overrepresented in the informal sector, especially in HCMC 
(where women represent 56% of employment compared with only 42% in the formal sector). 
3. Legal framework and current registration situation 
In Vietnam, not all household businesses have to register. Two kinds of households are 
exempt: those earning less than a certain amount set at district level (which cannot be below 
the minimum wage), and street vendors and xe ôm (motorbike taxis).  
 
Below a certain level of business done, household businesses are not required to get a 
business licence and can operate freely. Household businesses are exempt from business tax 
(and now from personal income tax) if their turnover is too small. The empirical evidence 
suggests that the informal sector as a whole is unknown to the State registration services. 
Nevertheless, the absence of registration (business licence) does not mean that the informal 
sector is not taxed; more than one-third of IHBs pay one sort of tax in Hanoi (mostly local 
taxes), although this proportion is much lower in HCMC.  
The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) is in charge of fixing the rules for registration 
of household businesses. Provincial MPI directorates are in charge of registration, which is 
conducted in practice by the districts. The problem is that the conditions are vague: there are 
numerous criteria, exceptions and different thresholds. Almost no IHBs (less than 1%) know 
the threshold above which HBs have to register. Even among the formal HBs, only a minority 
claim that they know the registration legislation (10% of FHBs in Hanoi and 20% in HCMC), 
and their knowledge appears to be limited since the magnitude of the registration threshold 
that they put forward varies substantially (from 2 million to 15 million per month).   
We can compute the proportion of IHBs that should be registered by law and, conversely, the 
proportion of FHBs that need not. These calculations should be viewed with caution, as the 
law itself is not very clear about which HBs should legally have a business licence and we do 
not know exactly what the actual locally adopted threshold is above which HBs have to 
register. Excluding the sectors exempt from registration, the proportion of IHB heads earning 
more than the minimum wage then provides an indicator of the percentage of ‘illegal’ IHBs 
(upper bound estimator).  In fact, one can consider that almost all household businesses (HBs) 
should theoretically be registered: as the thresholds are very low, there are almost no 
household businesses below them that are therefore exempted from registration, with haziness 
subsisting as to the legal need for roving HBs to register (Cling et al. 2010). 
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Our calculations have been undertaken using the HB&IS surveys conducted in Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City. The selected income variable is the operating surplus taken from the HB&IS 
Surveys (we prefer not to use earnings as the declarations are notoriously underestimated). 
We consider three legislative hypothesises: a) all HBs should have a business licence when 
they earn more than the minimum wage (450,000 VND/month; b) this income criterion does 
not apply to mobile HBs or HBs with improvised street pitches (it applies only to businesses 
working at home or with professional premises); c) this income criterion applies only to 
‘located’ HBs (with professional premises).  
Under the first hypothesis, 95% of IHBs should be registered in both cities (Table 2). If we 
relax the hypothesis by considering that only those with fixed premises fulfilling the income 
threshold should register, the share of ‘illegally’ operating IHBs drops significantly to around 
70% under the loose definition of ‘premises’ (including homes), and dramatically to 10%-
15% in the more restrictive case (considering only HBs with professional premises). These 
results merely reflect the fact that IHBs rarely operate on premises. ‘Manufacturing’ IHBs are 
the most advantaged in this respect (followed by ‘services’ and lastly ‘trade’, the most 
precarious). The figures are extremely close in the two cities. The only clear-cut conclusion to 
be drawn from this exercise is that HB registration legislation is unclear and all the more 
confusing for HB heads. This lack of transparency forms a breeding ground for discretionary 
decisions and for potential harassment and corruption by public officials.        
Table 2. Registration and ‘legality’ in the informal sector (%) 
 
Hypothesis: Income threshold applies to:  
 
H1- all kinds of HBs  H2- HBs at home or with  
professional premises 
 H3- only HBs with  
professional premises 
 Hanoi 
% of IHBs that should be registered 
Manufacturing 95.9  90.0  7.3 
Trade 93.1  60.3  21.8 
Services 96.0  65.7  13.0 
Total IHB 94.9  68.1  15.2 
% FHB* 2.7  5.5  42.0 
 Ho Chi Minh City 
% of IHBs that should be registered 
Manufacturing  95.4  93.8  6.0 
Trade 93.4  64.0  16.0 
Services 98.6  65.6  11.1 
Total IHB 95.4  71.3  11.6 
% FHB* 2.4  3.8  40.8 
Note: *: for FHBs, the reported figures are the % of HBs that are registered while it is not compulsory for them 
to be so. 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations.  
Turning to the FHBs, we ask why some HBs get a business licence when they do not have to. 
Based on the first hypothesis, less than 3% of FHBs earn less than the minimum wage, which 
means that they are complying with the legislation. However, if we consider that the income 
condition applies only to HBs with premises (or, in particular, industries), the diagnosis is 
quite different. For instance, under Hypothesis 3, more than 40% in both cities are registered 
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when they need not be. In this case, one interpretation could be that the cost/benefit analysis 
of registering leads HB heads to register in order to benefit from the expected advantages of 
operating in the formal sector.     
Lastly, whatever the ‘true’ scope of the registration formalities, legislation and procedures 
should be clarified to eradicate the grey area between formality/informality and 
legality/illegality, which is a source of both economic inefficiencies and inequities.  
4. HB heads’ attitudes towards registration 
In terms of business registration, there are two distinct situations that are, by definition, 
opposite: the situation of the IHBs, which are not registered, and the situation of the FHBs, 
which are registered. The vast majority of IHBs (72% in Hanoi and 79% in HCMC) believe 
that registration is not compulsory (Table 3). In addition to this huge proportion, 18% do not 
know whether they need to register in the capital city (7% in HCMC). All in all, regardless of 
the type of register considered (business, tax and social security registration), from 85% to 
90% of IHBs are not aware of the regulations. It is therefore essentially ignorance of their 
legal obligations that leads the heads of IHBs to fail to register.  
Neither the complexity nor the cost of the registration procedures appears to be a problem and 
there is no overt reluctance to cooperate with the public services. Only a tiny minority of less 
than 2% of IHBs openly refuse all cooperation with the State. Again, less than 2% of IHBs 
feel that the formalities are too complicated. Lastly, the monetary cost of registration is only 
raised by a maximum of 2% of those who have not registered. A not-inconsiderable 
proportion of IHBs (16% in Hanoi and 19% in HCMC) even say that they are willing to get a 
business licence. 
Table 3. Reasons for not being registered (%) 
 
Reasons why not registered  Prepared to 
register 
Too 
complicated  
Too 
expensive 
Registration 
in progress 
Not com- 
pulsory 
Don’t know 
if have to 
register 
Don’t want to 
cooperate 
with State 
Other  Total (business 
licence) 
 
 Hanoi 
Manufacturing 1.0 0.8 0.5 66.5 25.5 2.1 3.6 100 18.9 
Trade 2.8 0.6 2.0 69.3 18.2 2.7 4.4 100 17.6 
Services 1.0 0.6 0.2 76.5 14.1 2.0 5.7 100 14.1 
Total IHB 1.7 0.6 0.9 72.0 17.7 2.3 4.8 100 16.3 
 Ho Chi Minh City 
Manufacturing 1.3 0.3 0.6 83.0 4.9 0.0 9.8 100 19.2 
Trade 0.9 2.0 1.7 75.1 9.3 0.0 11.1 100 21.0 
Services 0.4 1.7 1.2 80.1 7.1 0.2 9.4 100 18.4 
Total IHB 0.8 1.5 1.2 79.1 7.3 0.1 10.0 100 19.4 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations. 
The qualitative survey conducted by the authors with HBs in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city 
assesses and illustrates the findings of the quantitative HB&IS survey (see Box). The analysis 
made in the previous section 3 showed that, if legislation were strictly enforced, almost all the 
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interviewed HBs would have to register. However, most of the informal HBs argue that their 
business is too small, claim that registration is not compulsory for them, and assert that 
nobody has asked them to register. Most of the informal HBs put forward the case of the 
small scale of their activity. The heads of HBs argue that they do not really run a business, 
just a ‘household activity’. So, according to them, registration is not compulsory, though they 
acknowledge their limited knowledge of the legislation, which is clearly illustrated by their 
declaration.  
The case of street vendors and service providers conducting their business in a public place 
like pavements and small lanes in the middle of a crowded neighbourhood merits special 
attention. Normally, they are not obliged to be registered, but they are banned in some streets. 
Due to both their personal circumstances and business conditions, those micro-entrepreneurs 
are not in a position to learn about and familiarize themselves with the laws concerning 
business registration. Not surprisingly, their limited knowledge of the regulations puts them in 
a difficult situation and is more problematic.  
On the whole, IHBs stress the fact that they have never been controlled by the authorities: 
they have had no contact with public officials or no one has asked them to register. They have 
a small business located in a small street (mostly at home), so the authorities simply ignore 
them.  
Informal activities therefore look to be more a sector of spontaneous development of 
economic activities by households rather than the result of a strategy to ‘evade’ legislation in 
force deemed inhibiting. The solution to the problem of non-registration in the informal sector 
calls first and foremost for an active communication policy by the State and probably for an 
administrative simplification of registration formalities. However, it would not be advisable to 
seek to indiscriminately increase tax pressure on the informal sector, given the meagre 
profitability of most IHBs. 
Reasons not being/being registered 
Illustration drawn from a qualitative survey in Hanoi and HCMC 
The findings presented in this article can be illustrated by some typical answers given by the informal 
HB heads on registration, along the three following lines. First, they justify their non-registration on 
the basis of their lack of knowledge of the legal obligation to register. Second, they declare that, due 
to a lack of control, they do not get the proper information on the legal framework and find no reason 
to register. Last of all, those which are not registered usually do not see any incentive to register. 
1. Lack of knowledge of legal obligations 
-  ‘I think that only big ‘enterprises’ need to register, my business is too small so there is no need for 
registration.’ (a rice and groceries seller); 
- ‘I think that my business involves no financial capital, only manual work. Only if I expand my 
business, I would be obliged register. ‘To expand’ is to grow and to become big in terms of capital, 
size, to hire additional employees, etc; then, it is required to register. I see that in this area, near the 
front road, there is a sewing workshop and they have to register.’ (a tailor); 
  - ‘I learnt from my friends and acquaintances that small shops don’t have to register as long as we 
sell no products like alcohol.’ (a seller of snacks and drinks); 
-  ‘I think that to register, you need to visit the Department of Planning and Investment, yet I am not 
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sure about the whole procedure. My own business is non-registered because of its tiny scale (just 1 
bus).’ (a bus rental); 
-  ‘This business is kind of … on a basis of family tradition, we only do it at home.’... ‘Only HBs with 
a shop need to register.’ (a producer of copper products); 
- ‘Only if your business has account books, has many clients, has earnings to pay employees and pay 
rentals’, then you have to register.’ (a lawyer); 
-  ‘I just manufacture goods, no trading here, thus no need to register.’ (a producer of aluminium and 
glass doors); 
- ‘I don’t know the legislation. All I know is that when I see the police officers, I have to run away. If 
not, I will be harassed or pay some money.’ (a fruit seller - street vendor); 
- ‘Whatever I do, I will be imposed a fine. I choose to stand on the streets where I can run quickly as 
the police officers come.’ (flower seller - street vendor). 
 
2. Absence of control 
- ‘I did not register my activity because nobody asked me to register. The same goes for all the HBs 
operating in this street. I think it is a traditional street activity. That’s why the State does not ask for 
registration.’ (a metal door manufacturer); 
- ‘I do not register because it is not compulsory. I run my business from home; it is not like other 
types of businesses.’ (a cake maker); 
- ‘My business is not registered because I work at home. The local authorities consider that my house 
is a normal house, they do not ask any questions about my activity. It is not like shops in a big street.’ 
(a dressmaker); 
- ‘It is a small business. I do not know much about the law. Administrative procedures are normally 
very complicated. Nobody asked me to register.’ (a tea and tobacco seller); 
- ‘I do not know the law, but nobody asked me to register. Too bad for the State, good for me because 
if I had to register, I would have to pay taxes, buy specific protection equipment, it is complicated.’ (a 
plastic tube manufacturer); 
- ‘I registered the trade activity in the shop where I sell the bread (as the shop front gives onto the 
street). Yet the manufacturing activity of making the bread (with about fifty wage workers, located on 
the corner of a small street) is not registered because the local authorities cannot control it.’ (a large 
informal bakery). 
 
3. Determinants/benefits of registration 
- ‘Registration is compulsory for shops in streets where the local authorities usually have control 
over business activities. If HBs are not registered, the authorities impose penalties on them.’ (a paint 
seller with a shop in the street); 
- ‘I am registered because it is compulsory for HBs that run a business in this market.’ (a fabric seller 
in a market); 
- ‘If I compare my situation with other HBs which are not registered, I do not have to pay a special 
amount to the police (except monthly and annual taxes): policemen do not bother me.’ (a clothes 
seller located in a big street);  
- ‘Officers from the local authorities asked me to register. If I had not registered, they would have 
come back regularly, almost every day. That’s worrying. So I decided to register. Still, there are some 
hairdressers who obstinately refuse to register.’ (a hairdresser located in a big street); 
- ‘As regards registration, if a public official asked me to register, I would be prepared to do so. But, 
until now, nobody has asked me, so why should I register? Registration does not give you any 
advantages. On the contrary, it entails complicated administrative procedures and tax payment.’ (a 
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plastic tube manufacturer);  
- ‘I found no advantages for HBs to be registered. Actually, registered HBs have more problems than 
unregistered ones since they have to deal with administrative formalities, taxes, rates, etc.’ (a 
hairdresser).  
Source: Qualitative survey, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, 2007 & 2009, GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL 
The views of the formal household businesses are particularly interesting when it comes to the 
potential advantages of registration (Table 4). The main benefit they see in registration is to 
avoid corruption (70% in Hanoi and 57% in HCMC), which suggests that the risk of 
corruption is perceived as being particularly high (which does not mean that actual corruption 
is; see below). The other two advantages they see in registration, although way behind the 
first, are access to better locations and the possibility of winning contracts with large firms. 
All in all, the vast majority recognize that being registered is positive: only 2% of FHBs in 
Hanoi and 14% in HCMC consider there is no advantage in being registered.  
The informal sector, which is not registered, also sees reducing the risk of corruption as a 
major incentive for registration: 32% of IHBs in Hanoi and 28% in HCMC share this point of 
view, which confirms the importance of this issue. Nevertheless, nearly 50% in both cities 
consider that there is no point in registering, suggesting that registration gives household 
businesses few advantages. This huge gap between the real advantages of registration 
perceived by HBs already registered and the low expectations of IHBs suggests that more 
effort should be put into informing IHBs about the potential rights gained by registering their 
activity.  
Table 4. Opinion and experience of business registration procedure in the informal sector (%) 
 
Main advantage of registering business  
Access to loan Access to 
market place 
Sale to 
large 
firms 
Adver- 
tising 
Face less 
corruption 
Other No 
Advantage 
Total 
 Hanoi 
Manufacturing 8.9 13.2 4.8 2.4 29.5 2.2 39.0 100 
Trade 5.0 10.2 4.3 0.6 32 .1 1.8 46.0 100 
Services 4.9 8.7 1.5 1.1 33.2 5.0 45.6 100 
Total IHB 5.7 10.0 3.2 1.2 32.1 3.3 44.5 100 
Total FHB 3.3 14.9 6.7 1.9 69.7 0.5 2.8 100 
Total HB 5.2 11.0 3.9 1.3 39.4 2.8 36.4 100 
 Ho Chi Minh City 
Manufacturing 3.1 13.2 5.5 1.2 29.4 10.1 37.4 100 
Trade 4.3 11.8 2.9 0.3 23.2 5.1 52.5 100 
Services 2.3 7.6 0.7 0.4 30.6 5.8 52.6 100 
Total IHB 3.1 10.2 2.5 0.5 28.0 6.5 49.2 100 
Total FHB 3.9 15.4 5.0 0.7 56.6 4.8 13.7 100 
Total HB 3.3 11.5 3.1 0.6 35.2 6.1 40.2 100 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations. 
Formal HBs (i.e. registered) are mainly those with professional premises (or a fixed location 
in a market) located in busy streets. Most of them are engaged in ‘trade’ (or ‘services’ such as 
a coffee shop). Their business is a visible one and provides a fairly high level of income (see 
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Table 1 above). When the interviewer of the qualitative survey asked why they had decided to 
become formal, they said that it is compulsory and they have to register to avoid trouble with 
the authorities. According to them, they face less trouble with public officials if they are 
registered. 
Nevertheless, some informal HBs are not really small and some of their characteristics are 
similar to formal HBs (high income in a busy street). So the reason why some HBs have to 
comply with the law (under pressure from public officials) while others are not concerned by 
the law is not totally clear. The former (the formal HBs) might just be the ones chosen by the 
public officials to be controlled and which decided to avoid problems leading to the payment 
of fines or gifts many times a year. Therefore, location appears to be a key variable. The HBs 
that prove to be the potential targets of controls are those that can be easily spotted and/or 
show enough external signs of wealth. In many cases, it is hard to imagine that the public 
officials are not aware of the existence and scale of the HBs’ activities.  
So even though most of the HBs do not specifically try to evade paying tax, for some HBs, it 
is the main reason why they have not registered. However, for the latter, it seems that their 
strategy is based less on a real intent to completely conceal their activity than on the 
opportunity of making the most of lax law enforcement and ineffective control. Most of the 
informal HBs declare that they would be prepared to register their activity should it prove to 
be compulsory. This finding confirms the fact that they do not deliberately intend to be 
outside the law. However, they are prepared to do so if there are some incentives like specific 
public support to expand their business (access to credit, premises, information, training, etc.). 
Many HB heads stressed the fact that becoming formal does not provide any advantages. Far 
from it, in fact, as heads of HBs merely have to pay more taxes and procedures are 
complicated. Those who register their business are the most visible ones. As they are subject 
to some sort of control by the authorities, they decide to comply with the law instead of 
paying regular ‘gifts’ to public officials. While some informal HBs pay taxes like the formal 
ones, the majority do not pay any taxes. HBs do not know how taxes are calculated and see 
them as being set in an arbitrary fashion (following negotiations between the HB head and the 
public official). Moreover, in addition to taxes, a large number of HBs have to periodically 
give a not-inconsiderable amount of money to public officials. The borderline between fines, 
“voluntary contributions” and corruption is not always clear for the HB heads, so this form of 
payment has become normal for them. 
5. What are the explanatory factors behind registration?  
The HB&IS Survey has the advantage of capturing both formal HBs and informal HBs at the 
same time. We propose here using an econometric estimation to study more in detail why 
some production units register and others do not. By estimating simple probit models, we do 
not pretend to tackle endogeneity issues (given our cross-section surveys, no credible 
instruments are at hand), but to find significant associations. The purpose of this is to identify 
different types of factors (correlates) and analyze the extent to which they may have 
influenced business heads’ decisions to become formal. This clarification rounds out the 
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analysis presented above in this paper and the qualitative approach presented in Box 1. The 
explanatory factors can be classed into three categories: 
• The first factors are those directly related to the legislation in force; 
• The second category covers individual factors associated either with the production 
unit heads’ characteristics (‘head of household business’) or, in a corollary way, with 
the reasons why they set up the units; 
• The third category concerns the incentives. 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results of our econometric estimations taking into account these 
three different kinds of factors. The Pseudo-R2 continually increases when we add 
explanatory factors: it is 0.10 only when we take into account three factors related solely to 
legislation (size, number of wage workers and value-added); and it increases when we add 
factors related to the HB heads’ characteristics (Table 6). The Pseudo-R2 reaches its 
maximum level when the three categories of factors are taken into account in the model 
(Table 7). 
5.1 Legislation-driven factors 
Bear in mind that HBs meeting a certain number of criteria theoretically have to register. 
Although the definition of these criteria and how they are enforced remains somewhat vague, 
they do concern three HB characteristics: income generated (if the income they generate 
exceeds a given threshold); type of premises (roving activities do not have to register); and 
type of business (some activity sectors are subject to special controls). If the law were strictly 
enforced, these characteristics would be enough to explain why some HBs are formal 
(registered) and others are informal (unregistered). However, in keeping with the previous 
analyses, our econometric results find this to be far from the case. 
The model’s findings (Table 5) show that HB incomes, as well as size, are positively and 
significantly correlated with the registration decision. The probability of registering increases 
with the annual value-added generated by the units or with their size (number of workers). 
The question could be asked as to the direction of the causality for these two variables. Did 
the HB’s level of business lead its head to register? Or did the fact of being registered enable 
the business to grow? Based on panel data of Vietnamese manufacturing SMEs, Rand and 
Torm (2012b) conclude that formalizing is beneficial both to firms and the workers in these 
firms. However, in both cases, concern to comply with the law (at the time of registration or 
before) could well have played a role. Note that the legislation does not directly consider HB 
size (number of persons working in the unit) as a criterion (except for units employing more 
than ten people, which must then register pursuant to the Law on Enterprises). Yet size is 
closely correlated with the level of business and is easier to measure reliably than income 
generated (or value-added). Secondly, the larger the units, the more visible they are and 
therefore the more likely they are to be controlled by public officials, forcing them to register. 
Moreover, given identical business size, the probability of registration would appear to 
decrease with the number of employees (all the HBs are made up of an HB head 
accompanied, where applicable, by family workers and employees). This finding could reflect 
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a will to dodge the obligation to register these employees with social security, a hypothesis 
consistent with Castel and To's results (2012) on formal enterprises. 
In terms of activity sectors, the law singles out mainly roving businesses (which are exempt) 
and a few specific activities calling for strict controls (health and safety: sale of food products, 
pharmaceuticals, gas, etc.), which are legally bound to register. So, aside from these few 
specific activities, we might expect to find relatively homogeneous behaviour in terms of 
registration. Yet the probability of registering varies a great deal from one sector to the next. 
Manufacturing activities (textiles, manufacture of food products, etc.) and especially HBs in 
the “construction” sector turn out to be the least inclined to register. Service activities are in a 
mid-range position, but the probability of their being registered remains lower than roving 
traders. Trade businesses are the most liable to comply with the law. Of these, in keeping with 
the legislation, wholesale traders and retail traders set up in specific stores are more likely to 
register as formal businesses than roving traders. 
Lastly, the type of premises plays a decisive role in registration. The decision to register is 
found much more frequently among HBs with professional premises and is much scarcer 
among HBs without fixed business premises. HBs that run their business from home are 
found between these two extremes. 
Table 5. Explanatory factors for HB registration: legislation-related factors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size (Total number of workers) 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.4*** 
(9.991) (9.676) (9.676) (7.130) 
Number of employees -0.3*** -0.3*** -0.3*** -0.2*** 
(-6.998) (-5.217) (-5.217) (-4.109) 
Value-added (annual) 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 
(7.664) (6.600) (6.600) (6.328) 
Sector  (reference: outside retail store) 
      
Textile, leather, shoes 
 
-0.4*** 
(-2.975) 
Food processing & other manufacture 
 
-0.3** 0.1 0.1 
(-2.478) (0.643) (0.414) 
Construction 
 
-2.1*** -1.7*** -1.4*** 
(-5.773) (-4.554) (-3.714) 
Wholesale trade 
 
0.3** 0.3** 0.3* 
(2.126) (2.126) (1.696) 
Retail trade professional stores 
 
0.6*** 0.6*** 0.5*** 
(5.946) (5.946) (4.672) 
Hotel accommodation 
 
-0.4*** 0.1 -0.4*** 
(-3.833) (0.476) (-2.636) 
Repair service 
 
-0.2 0.3* -0.4* 
(-1.038) (1.766) (-1.822) 
Transport service 
 
-0.5*** 
(-3.499) 
Other services 
 
0.1 0.6*** -0.1 
(1.194) (4.578) (-0.645) 
Industry (reference: services) 
    
    Manufacturing & construction 
  
0.1 -0.5*** 
(0.354) (-2.793) 
Trade  
  
0.5*** -0.1 
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(3.499) (-0.837) 
Type of premises (ref.: outdoor premises) 
    
    Professional premises 
   
1.8*** 
(16.30) 
Premises at home 
   
1.0*** 
(9.454) 
Intercept -1.5*** -1.5*** -2.0*** -2.3*** 
(-20.87) (-13.99) (-16.05) (-15.82) 
Observations 2,637 2,637 2,637 2,637 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.31 
Log-likelihood -1,360 -1,223 -1,223 -1,046 
  Note: Probit estimation. z statistics in parentheses.  
 *** coefficient significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at the 10% level. 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations. 
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5.2 Individual factors 
With respect to the HB heads’ characteristics, firstly, the level of education significantly 
influences their behaviour with regard to the legislation. The most well-educated are more 
inclined to register. They are better informed, more able to handle the procedures and more 
ambitious when it comes to developing their business. Secondly, women seem less willing to 
register the businesses they run, but the significance of the coefficient is small (Table 6). This 
finding could be due to their attitude to their activity, which they do not see as a real 
‘business’, but as an ‘auxiliary’ activity. In line with this logic, the reasons why the HBs were 
set up also influence the registration decisions. Businesses set up to be independent or to 
follow a family tradition display a greater probability of being formal compared with those set 
up for lack of an alternative (for want of a wage job) or to make extra income for the 
household (auxiliary activity). Therefore, the formal or informal nature of a business would 
appear to be determined right from its creation. Consistently, the number of years in business 
apparently has no impact on registration, confirming that many HBs are stuck in an 
‘informality trap’. Lastly, migrants, more vulnerable and less confident about how long their 
businesses will last, are less likely to register them. All these findings are in line with the 
literature which stresses that micro firms’ dynamics (like formalization and economic 
performance) are highly dependent on the reason for setting up the business: the more it is a 
real choice (and the less a constraint), the more the HB is economically efficient (Perry et al., 
2007).   
5.3 Incentives 
The unit heads (formal and informal) were asked about the advantages they could gain from 
registering their businesses. The incentives they mentioned prove decisive insofar as, other 
things being equal, the probability of having a formal business is greater among those who 
mention them (compared with those who raise no advantages). Access to credit is one 
exception since it could potentially be facilitated by registration, but this benefit is not 
confirmed by the registered HBs (Table 7). However, access to markets, the possibility of 
developing relations with large firms and the possibility of becoming known all appear to 
have influenced the unit heads’ decisions to register. Similarly, one of the factors mentioned 
the most by the formal HBs is that registration means they are less exposed to corruption. 
Turning from opinion to experience, being actually affected by corruption is a significant 
factor in favour of formalizing the business, confirming that registration may be an effective 
way to reduce corruption.     
These findings are paradoxical in that formal HBs are also the hardest hit by corruption (see 
Table A in annex). To solve this paradox, we have studied the cross effects of the two 
variables (actual experience of corruption, on the one side, and saying that registration 
reduces corruption, on the other). The results show that registration is positively and 
significantly correlated with mentioning this advantage, irrespective of whether the HBs are 
victims of corruption or not. So registration provides at least partial protection from 
corruption (as the HBs feel they would be harder hit if they were informal). 
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Table 6.  Explanatory factors for HB registration (with individual factors)  
 
(5) (6) (7) 
   
   
Size (total number of workers) 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.4*** 
(6.247) (6.209) (6.619) 
Number of employees -0.2*** -0.2*** -0.3*** 
(-3.724) (-3.878) (-4.543) 
Value-added 0.0*** 0.0*** 0.0*** 
(6.786) (6.667) (6.120) 
Industry (reference: service) 
  
   Manufacturing & construction -0.4*** -0.4*** -0.4*** 
(-3.891) (-4.004) (-3.504) 
Trade  0.4*** 0.4*** 0.5*** 
(6.403) (6.179) (6.700) 
Type of premises (ref.: outdoor premises) 
  
   Professional premises 1.5*** 1.5*** 1.4*** 
(12.33) (12.07) (10.98) 
Premises at home 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.5*** 
(5.128) (5.060) (4.151) 
Owner of premises (ref.: squatted or other) 
   
   Own premises 0.7*** 0.7*** 0.7*** 
(5.268) (4.827) (4.872) 
Rented premises 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 
(4.715) (4.273) (4.430) 
Nb years existence 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(0.856) (0.777) (1.362) 
Household main client -0.2** -0.2** -0.2* 
(-2.153) (-2.067) (-1.899) 
Reason for setting up HB (ref.: no job as wage 
worker)    
  
   Reason: to get higher income 
 
0.1 0.1 
(1.128) (0.983) 
Reason: to be independent 
 
0.5*** 0.5*** 
(5.330) (5.408) 
Reason: family tradition or other 
 
0.2* 0.2* 
(1.766) (1.817) 
Characteristics of HB head  
   
   Female  
  
-0.1* 
(-1.915) 
Education: lower secondary (ref.=primary) 
  
0.3** 
(2.260) 
Education: upper secondary (ref.=primary) 
  
0.6*** 
(5.478) 
Education: university (ref.=primary) 
  
0.8*** 
(5.861) 
Migrant 
  
-0.4** 
(-2.147) 
Intercept -2.6*** -2.8*** -3.1*** 
(-15.41) (-15.67) (-15.20) 
Observations 2,636 2,636 2,636 
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.31 0.34 
Log-likelihood -1,056 -1,039 -1,004 
Note: Probit model. z statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations. 
 
  
17 
 
Table 7. Explanatory factors for HB registration (with incentives)  
 
 
(8) (9) (10) 
   
    Reason for setting up HB (ref: no job as wage worker) 
    
    Reason: to get higher income 
 
0.1 0.1 0.1 
(1.151) (0.908) (0.898) 
Reason: to be independent 
 
0.5*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 
(4.982) (4.967) (4.973) 
Reason: tradition or other 
 
0.3** 0.3** 0.2** 
(2.421) (2.283) (2.265) 
Characteristics of HB head  
    
    Female  
 
-0.2** -0.1* -0.1* 
(-2.103) (-1.726) (-1.717) 
Education: lower secondary 
 
0.2** 0.2** 0.2** 
(2.112) (2.040) (2.054) 
Education: upper secondary 
 
0.6*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 
(5.115) (5.082) (5.084) 
Education: university 
 
0.8*** 0.8*** 0.8*** 
(5.221) (5.169) (5.188) 
Migrant 
 
-0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
(-1.636) (-1.516) (-1.507) 
Incentives (advantage of registration according to the HB head) 
    Reference=‘no advantage’ 
    
    Advantage: access to credit 
 
0.3 0.3 0.3 
(1.451) (1.505) (1.513) 
Advantage: access to market 
 
0.6*** 0.7*** 0.7*** 
(5.506) (5.484) (5.492) 
Advantage: access to big firm 0.8*** 0.8*** 0.8*** 
(4.401) (4.484) (4.507) 
Advantage: advertising 
 
1.0*** 1.0*** 1.0*** 
(3.017) (2.935) (2.913) 
Advantage: other 
 
0.7*** 0.7*** 0.7*** 
(3.950) (3.786) (3.754) 
Advantage: less corruption 
 
1.1*** 1.1*** 
(11.85) (11.69) 
Victim of corruption 
  
0.6*** 0.7*** 
(4.125) (3.295) 
‘Adv. less corruption’*‘victim of corruption’ 
  
0.9*** 
(3.161) 
‘Adv. less corruption’*‘Not victim of corruption’ 
  
1.1*** 
(11.61) 
Intercept 
 
-3.8*** -4.0*** -4.0*** 
(-16.50) (-16.60) (-16.63) 
Controls: legislation + individual characteristics 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
2,636 2,636 2,636 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.39 0.40 0.40 
Log-likelihood 
 
-918 -910 -910 
Notes: Probit model. z statistics in parentheses  
Coefficients for the factors related to the legislation, the owner of the premises and the type of customer are not 
reported here since they remain unchanged (see model (7) in Table 6). 
*** coefficient significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at the 10% level. 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations. 
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5. Conclusion 
It has often been claimed that informality is caused by an excess of public regulations, 
especially steep rates of taxation in the formal sector, and the deliberate will on the part of 
informal set-ups to evade the legislation (i.e. the abovementioned ‘legalist’ approach). This 
theory is partially refuted in the case of Vietnam. All in all, regardless of the type of register 
considered (business, tax and social security registration), almost all the IHBs are unaware of 
the regulations. This situation is consistent with the results obtained by Tran Tien Cuong et al. 
(2008) based on a large sample of household businesses surveyed in more than ten 
Vietnamese provinces. It is therefore essentially ignorance of their legal obligations that leads 
the heads of informal household businesses to fail to register.  
In general, IHBs benefit from the haziness surrounding the issue of registration regulations. 
Even though this behaviour is partly involuntary (little understanding of the laws), informality 
does mean they evade taxes and certain regulations. We observe here a combination of 
characteristics in keeping with the ‘dualist’ (see above regarding earnings and labour 
protection) and ‘legalist’ approach, although the latter is only really confirmed for a small 
number of IHBs. Indeed, although they pay less taxes, most IHBs consider that they would be 
less subject to corruption if they registered. In addition, the reasons why the HBs were set up 
also influence the registration decisions. Businesses set up to be independent or to follow a 
family tradition (reflecting a positive choice) have a greater probability of being formal 
compared with those set up for lack of an alternative (for want of a wage job) or to make extra 
income for the household (‘auxiliary activity’). Panel data analysis (now available with a 
second round of HB&IS Surveys) may be a useful avenue to strengthen our econometric 
results, by controlling for time invariant unobservables and better addressing endogeneity 
issues.  
To conclude, some policy implications may be drawn. All in all, it appears that the informal 
sector has not yet really attracted the attention it deserves from the Vietnamese authorities. A 
vast majority of informal household businesses believe that registration is not compulsory, in 
spite of the fact that our analysis underlines that most of them should be registered according 
to the regulations. In general, formalising IHBs is seen as a way of increasing government 
revenues (by taxing those IHBs not previously subject to the tax) and improving IHBs’ 
operating conditions and earnings. In Vietnam, IHB registration does not appear to be 
perceived as difficult (World Bank 2011). The priority is therefore, first and foremost, to put 
in place formalization incentives, which could take the form of granting special advantages 
(access to credit, social protection, access to professional premises, etc.). Given that our 
analysis shows that some HBs are informal by choice on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation 
of formalization, this means changing their trade-off terms. 
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ANNEX  
 
Table A. Descriptive statistics on household businesses (%) 
 Hanoi HCMC 
 IHBs FHBs IHBs FHBs 
Individual HB head characteristics     
-Women 53.5 51.3 57.8 53.9 
-Number of years of schooling 9.5 11.2 7.9 9.9 
-Migrant 1.0 1.7 8.0 4.0 
Main reason for setting up an HB     
-Did not find wage-earning work 30.6 13.8 18.9 6.4 
-Did not find wage-earning work in HB 11.9 6.5 11.1 2.4 
-To get a better income 28.8 33.9 14.7 18.3 
-To be independent (own boss) 14.2 31.0 34.1 54.4 
-By family tradition 2.6 10.5 7.4 12.5 
-Other 11.8 4.4 13.7 6.1 
Pay taxes     
-Business tax 16.4 88.1 1.6 78.4 
-Income tax 1.7 28.0 1.1 57.0 
-Local taxes 23.1 21.6 12.6 18.5 
Victim of corruption     
-Incidence of corruption 4.5 7.4 1.6 4.4 
-(In event of problem) paid a fine 15.8 14.1 9.6 20.1 
-(In event of problem) paid a bribe 14.2 27.0 13.0 19.8 
Source: HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL; authors’ calculations. 
                                                 
1
 The authors conducted a research programme in Vietnam as members of the DIAL team (Development, 
Institutions and Globalisation) from the French Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) in 
collaboration with the General Statistics Office (GSO) from 2006 to 2011. 
2
 The HB&IS Survey was conducted before the government’s decision to expand Hanoi province, which was put 
into effect in August 2008. According to the 2009 Population Census, which included ‘greater Hanoi’, the 
population of the country’s capital (6.5 million inhabitants) is now almost equal to HCMC (7.1 million). 
3
 On average, 1USD=16,000 VND in 2007. 
